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A Game Theoretical Approach for Reputation Propagation in Online Social
Networks
Maziar Gomrokchi
Formation of mutual trust between users of an Online Social Network (OSN) is a function of
many parameters. One of these parameters that has been widely investigated is the reputation of
users. Users interact with each other with different intentions and as a result of their interactions
they propagate each other's reputation. In the absence of centralized trusted parties in OSNs,
the only way for an agent to estimate others' reputation is the other agents' thoughts about that
agent. Therefore, intention and behavior of agents in the propagation of each other's reputation
become crucial.
In this thesis, we propose a game theoretic model of reputation propagation among users in
OSNs. We use this model to first study the dynamics of propagation and then analyze users'
behavior with respect to their reputation in the network. To do so, we expose the Nash equi-
libria of the proposed game. Finally, we develop some experiments on the large-scale social
network of Epinons and compare our findings in the theoretical part with the observations from
the experiments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction, Motivation and Rationale
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are considered as the main source of social interactions for
Internet users. Formation of social ties can be considered as a result of mutual trust among
users. In OSNs, users' relations are extremely sensitive. Peers' relations may be affected not
only by their behavior but also by some other external changes in the network. One of the
major changes which has a large effect on agents' interaction is the change in the trust relation
among users in the network. Typically, OSNs grow very fast and become very large-scale,
making repeated interactions between pairs of users infrequent; this inhibits the formation of
users' reputation. As the reputation of users propagates among other users, the network map
starts changing, which has some effects on social ties. Since the propagation of users' reputation
in OSNs is a key factor in the formation of this reputation, we explore this phenomenon in
order to have better understanding about patterns of change in user's reputation, which allows
understanding the formation dynamics of trust and distrust relations among agents.
This chapter introduces the context of research in both areas of trust-distrust and reputation
propagation. It presents the motivations of this work and describes our contributions. The last
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section presents the thesis organization.
1.1 Context of Research
This thesis proposes a model to analyze the reputation propagation in OSNs. Our main focus is
on the modeling of users' interactions with respect to the propagation of their reputation using
probabilistic and game theoretic modeling techniques. We present a new approach to model
propagation of reputation in OSNs. The main objective of our work is to analyze the behavior of
users as rational and selfish agents with respect to their reputation in a social network. This goal
is achieved through the design of a game as a model of interactions and its analysis considering
both theoretical and experimental perspectives. The contributions of this thesis are discussed in
more details in Section 1.3.
1.2 Motivations
Users' reputation in OSNs can be easily manipulated by their social peers in the network. Many
observations [12, 17,36,42] made on OSNs show that users (considered as rational agents) ought
to be careful about their reputation (i.e., the opinion others have ofus). Reputation can be thought
of as a source of trust (i.e., firm reliance on the relation between two agents), which means that
agents with a good reputation have higher chance to be interpreted as trustworthy agents.
We encapsulate agents' behavioral perspectives on how to increase their reputation in OSNs
and consequently interact with their social peers between two extreme bounds, Presentisi and
Futurist. We define Presentisi agents as these relying on other agents' current reputation to
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make decisions about their interactions, whereas Futurist agents are those that do not rely on
the current reputation of other agents; however, they are more interested in the consistency of
their future trend of reputation. The objective of futurist agent is to promote their popularity in
the network.
Using the pattern of reputation propagation [38, 53] in OSNs, Futurist agents focus on
peers with whom they have more chance to build long term and stable relations. Since we are not
assuming the existence of any trusted third party to assist agents in their evaluation about each
other, the only source for agent a to evaluate agent 6's trustworthiness is the public's thought about
b. Doing so, two interesting questions arise: 1) Which peers with a specific behavioralperspective
(in this thesis we only assume Presentisi and Futurist) should agent choose to interact with in
order to maximize his reputation in the network?; T) How do these two behavioral perspectives
affect an agent's reputation in his life time in OSN? To answer these two questions, we propose
to model the formation of reputation propagation streams in OSNs and analyze the dynamics of
agents' behavior with respect to these patterns of reputation propagation.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the proposition of an approach to model the users' actions
in propagation of their reputation in the of OSNs. Game theory has been used as a formal
modeling tool to analyze the propagation of users' reputation considering their actions. In the
first contribution, we encapsulate two major behavioral perspectives among users as Presentist
and Futurist. After that, we define two notions of Local Reputation and Reputation Propagation
in the context of OSNs. Using these two notions, we deploy on-shot and repeated games which
3
model agents interactions in the context of OSNs with respect to their number of interactions.
We also provide a theoretical analysis of these games.
In the second contribution of this thesis, we analyze the fundamental characteristics of the
social network of Epinions [1] and then experimentally verify our findings in the theoretical part
by proposing different experimental metrics and scenarios. To do so, we develop an open source
software which includes two parts. The first part includes a filtering algorithm that runs on a
given dataset and extracts specific agents with some given behavioral perspective. The second
part of our software is composed of a behavior analyzer program which first traces the behavior
of users (exposed as outputs of filtering program) within a given period of time (in this thesis is
six months) and then analyzes their behavior. To this end, we defined Mean Local Reputation
Deviation(MLRD), to measure the success of agents in increasing their local reputation and Mean
Expansion Chance Deviation (MELD), to measure the success of users with different types in
propagating their reputation.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This chapter provides the motivating context and objectives for this work. The remainder of
the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the related work in the areas
of trust/distrust and reputation in the context of social networks. Chapter 3 describes our game
theoretic model of reputation propagation in OSNs along with a theoretical analysis. Chapter 4
presents some experiments on a given OSN. Chapter 5 concludes this work and identifies some




Two main directions of research in the context of trust/distrust between peers in OSNs are: 1)
trust/distrust management and 2) trust/distrust propagation modeling and analysis. In both direc-
tions the ultimate goal is to predict agents' behaviors with respect to their level of trust/distrust
about each other. In this chapter, we review the literature related to models and methods of prop-
agation and management of trust/distrust in social networks. In Section 2.1, the basic concepts
and fundamentals are presented. Techniques towards modeling of trust/distrust propagation in
social networks are presented in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we focus on approaches for man-
aging trust/distrust (providing decenteralized/centeralized systems to cope with the problem of
uncertainty in agents' trustworthiness) in OSNs. Finally, Section 2.4 summarizes the chapter.
2.1 Basic Concepts
2.1.1 Trust Definitions in Different Domains
"...trust is a term with many meanings." (Williamson, 1993: [57]).
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"Trust is itself a term for a clustering of perceptions." (White, 1992).
Before starting to discuss the relation between trust and social networks, we need to discuss
definitions of trust in different contexts. In fact, trust is considered as a domain dependent concept
and it has various definitions in different domains.
Sociology: In sociological literature trust is defined as a concept and tool to obtain a social
order. This implies that a higher social order is the outcome of truthful behavior. According to
Sztompka's [55] "trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others". In this definition the
author mainly focuses on the risk and uncertainty elements of granting trust in mutual relations
between peers in a society. Another perspective of trust comes from Coleman's [ll]in this book
Foundation ofSocial Theory, which suggests a 4-part definition:
1. "Placement of trust allows actions that otherwise are not possible."
2. "If the person in whom trust is placed (trustee) is trustworthy, then the trustor will be better
off than if he or she had not trusted. Conversely, if the trustee is not trustworthy, then the
trustor will be worse off than if he or she had not trusted."
3. "Trust is an action that involves a voluntary transfer of resources."
4. "A time lag exists between the extension of trust and the result of the trusting behavior."
Cognitive science: According to the paper written by Castelfranchi and Falcone [14], defini-
tions that arise from cognitive science perspective are generally built based on some assertions.
Some examples of these assertions are:
1. Only cognitive agents [25] (an agent with the ability of cognition who endowed with goals,
beliefs and reasoning capablities) can "trust" another agent.
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2. Trust basically is a mental state, a complex attitude of an agent ? towards another agent y
about a behaviour/action relevant for the goal.
3. Trust is the mental counter-part of delegation.
Philosophy:
"Whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives.": SISSELA
BOK, 1978. [8]. Philosophers mostly discussed the similarities between trust and other notions
and rarely gave a precise definition of trust. For example Barbara Misztal in her book [47]
describes trust as a notion which does three things in the life of people: 1) it does prediction, T)
creates sense of community, and 3) helps them to have a better life together. Moral philosophers,
such as Baier and McLeod had influential contribution in defining trust. One of the most precise
definitions that we could extract from philosophical contexts is: "Trust is an attitude that we have
towards people whom we hope will be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property, not an
attitude" [44].
Economy: Trust in this context is defined based on the mutual relation of costumer-provider
or supplier-buyer. In the following definition, Hosmer in [24] defined trust by merging two
disciplines of organizational theory and philosophy :
"Trust is the expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethically justifiable behavior - that
is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of analysis - on the part of
the other person, group or firm in a joint endeavor or economic exchange."
After the publication of this definition, some experts disagreed on some parts of it such as the
meaning of "ethically justifiable behavior". After Hosmer, Arrow in [6] published his definition
of trust between buyer and supplier as follows:
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"Trust and similar values, loyalty, or truth telling are examples of what an economist would
call "externalities." They are goods; they are commodities; they have real practical value; they
increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever
values you hold in high esteem. But they are not commodities for which trade on the open
market is technically possible or even meaningful."
2.1.2 Trust and Distrust in Social Networks
Agents in social networks repeatedly interact with each other and trust among theme emerges
along these interactions. Sociological and economical definitions of trust are generally applicable
in the context of OSNs. Depending of the type of relation among agents (business or friendship
relation they can either explicitly or implicitly reveal their level of trust to each other.
Some researchers have defined trust metrics that are used to measure the trust level of agents
in social networks with respect to the context of relation. These metrics in social networks can
be classified into two main categories of global and local [60]. Global trust ranks are assigned to
an individual based upon complete trust graph information. Numerous global trust metrics have
been proposed [21, 32, 35, 52]. Surprisingly, some researchers claim that only local trust metrics
are "real" metrics for trust in social networks, since global ones consider the global reputation
rather than personalized trust [48]. Most of proposed metrics for trust are applied for scenarios
different from the ones encountered in social networks. In fact, research in trust infrastructure
and metrics for social networks is still preliminary. Some researchers also have a semantic web
approach to the definition of trust in the context of social networks [17, 18, 28].
According to Gans et al. [15], "distrust is regarded as just the other side of the coin, that
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is, there is generally a symmetric scale with complete trust on one end and absolute distrust on
the other." Guha in [20] and Guha et al. in [21] pointed out the important role of distrust in
trust propagation applications, mentioning that "distrust statements are very useful for users to
debug their Web of Trust". However, literature in this domain still suffers from lack of precise
definitions and models.
From above sections, we conclude that trust is a complex concept that has been defined from
different perspectives depending on the context. Because we are dealing social networks in this
thesis, we build our model (Chapter 3) based on the sociological perspectives.
2.2 Trust and Distrust Propagation Models in Social Networks
There are different ways for users in a social network to evaluate trustworthiness of other users.
One of the most recent approaches is the propagation of trust and distrust. Researchers by ana-
lyzing the structure of propagation try to come up with a technique to predict the trustworthiness
of others. In this part of this chapter we give an overview on the literature related to different
models of analyzing trust and distrust propagation in social networks.
2.2.1 Models based on the Theory of Transitivity
In these models, authors assumed that trust and distrust are transitive concepts and therefore
propagate among nodes in social networks. However, they rarely worked on propagation of
distrust and mostly focused on trust propagation. In real scenarios, trust is not fully transitive
and agents may behave differently in various cases. For example, if agent a trusts agent b and
b trusts c, we cannot infer that a trusts c. This depends on the level of trust that agents have
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about each other and on other factors such as different referral paths in the network, meaning
that agent a may have been introduced to c from other paths as an untrustworthy agent. Given
this issue, researchers proposed different methods of transition and aggregation to resolve this
conflict. Guha et al. [21] have provided some new matrix operations in order to aggregate trust
values transiting from different paths of relation. They proposed two methods of propagation,
atomic propagation and trust-distrust propagation. This approach is somewhat inefficient in terms
of both space and time complexity. Hang et al. [22] took the dynamism of environment into
consideration and analyzed the propagation of trust in multi-agent environments. They proposed
new algebraic methods of trust propagation to analyze the constituting evidence. However, their
trust measurement does not take into account the fact that the anarchic behavior of an agent might
change his trustworthiness beyond the period of observation.
2.2.2 Social Models of Propagation
In the social models of propagation models that capture the propagation of users's behavior in a
given environment based on sociological theories, researchers applied social science theory in the
context of social network in order to predict the pattern of propagation. Authors in [19] described
how, within the context of the small world network topology [45], the social concepts of trust
can be applied to guarantee the security of ad hoc networks. In [5] authors analyzed dynamics
of friendship and enmity in social networks by applying the theory of social balance, proposed
in [23]. Social balance theory is a class of theories that explains how the agents tendencies
in converging to a state of cognitive harmony and pleasant would influence the structure of a
network. In social balance theory the most important component among social agents is assumed
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to be "sentiment". These sentiments would lead agents to two groups of Disliking and Liking.
In [23] the authors, after analyzing this dynamics, observed that a friendly link changes to an
unfriendly one or vice versa in an imbalanced triad (relationship triangles) to make the triad
balanced. They found out that such networks converge to "utopia" (all friendly links). In this
research, the obtained results are somehow far from the reality and this is expectable since they
did not consider other social theories of propagation such as status theory [41]. In status theory,
social status of an agent is defined as the position or rank of an agent within the society or the
network that the agent belongs to. Status theory describes agents goal in creating social ties as
an intention of improving their social status in the network. For example, if agent A creates a
link to agent B this can be interpreted as B has a higher social status in comparison to A, since
A is the creator of the link. Status theory contradicts the balance theory [23] in some cases. For
example, if agent A creates a trust link to agent B (representing that agent A trusts agent B)
and B creates a trust link to agent C, then balance theory suggests that agent C might create a
trust link to A, but based on status theory, C considers A in a lower status compared to himself
and therefore, status theory suggests that agent C might create a distrust link to agent A. One
of the most recent works in this domain is done by Leskovec et al. in [41]. In this work, the
authors assumed that the relations between users in online social networks are either friendly
or antagonistic. They used two classical theories of friendship (theories concerning about the
formation of friendship relations in social communities), status theory and balance theory from
phycology and sociology, in order to model the patterns of propagation in real world networks and
after extracting some informative perspectives on the link structures. They found that according
to balance theory triangles with exactly two positive edges are largely underemphasized in the
data, whereas triangles with three positive edges are largely overemphasized. The main result
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they obtained is that the theory of status is more effective to present the pattern of trust and
distrust propagation, and this can be extended to capture user attitudes and linking tendencies.
2.2.3 Economical Models
In these models, agents are assumed to be rational self interested entities, and willing to maximize
their utility. The main problem in modeling trust and distrust propagation in social networks
using this approach is formalizing the utility with respect to the users' preferences in the network.
Users in an OSN do not necessarily have the same interests and preferences and therefore payoff
calculation method with respect to their actions should consider all of these preferences, which
may conflicting, in some aggregated functions. Because of this difficulty in modeling of payoff
functions, researchers have proposed some application-dependent models with some limited and
somehow strong assumptions. There are some proposals to analyze and resolve the problem
of defining an aggregated utility ftmctin [7,26]. In Chapter 3 we propose another probabilistic
approach to calculate a piecewise payoff function in order to resolve this problem.
2.3 Trust Assessment Mechanisms in Social Networks
A large body of work has been conducted in the field of trust management in various environ-
ments [3 1,32,34,52]. One of these environments that has recently emerged in the area of trust/dis-
trust assessment mechanisms is social networks. Two basic lines of research that are conducted
in this area are: decentralized and centralized mechanisms.
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2.3.1 Centralized Mechanisms
Researchers have generally studied trust in social networks via some centralized reputation mech-
anisms [59]. Centralized reputation mechanisms assume the existence of trusted third parties in
their prediction of trust rates. The main weakness of these mechanisms is that they cannot be
established in large scale networks, where the enormous number of users is interacting with each
other and therefore the monitoring of all interactions becomes to some extent impossible [9].
There are different approaches in designing such mechanisms. Two major approaches can be
distinguished as follows:
Offline approaches
In these approaches, researchers design a cental logging mechanism in order to monitor
agents' interactions and save them in some log files, in order to be able to trace agents' inter-
actions and therefore keep track of their history [33, 34]. Afterwards, the mechanism employs
some offline calculations to measure the trustworthiness of agents. The main problem in apply-
ing these mechanisms in practice is related to their computational complexity. These types of
mechanisms are hardly adaptable with real time systems.
Online approaches
Proposals about the online management of trust in social networks and online communities
have normally approached the problem from mechanism design perspective. The intuition be-
hind this is the computationally efficient nature of these techniques. Mechanisms proposed in
this literature are mostly incentive compatible [29], meaning that these mechanisms secure the
trustfulness of users in their interactions with other users. Miller et al. [46] employed scoring
rules [10] in order to elicit truthful reports from agents and after that they proved the incentive
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compatibility of designed incentives in the context of signaling reputation mechanisms. The pay-
ment schemes are designed based on proper scoring rules (measure of users' performance while
acting under uncertainty). Jurca and Faltings [30] extend the Miller's work by applying a compu-
tational approach to designing an incentive compatible payment method. Instead of scoring rules,
they modeled the payment as an optimization problem that minimizes the total budget required.
2.3.2 Decentralized Mechanisms
These mechanisms are established with the assumption that there is no central trusted party so
that users can refer to in order to asses trust of other users. Each user is equipped with his own
trust assessment mechanism. These mechanisms generally have a payment function which calcu-
lates the amount of payment that should be provided to the other agents as incentives in order to
ensure their truthfulness. The main difference between centralized and decentralized mechanisms
is the type of information that they employ in their trust assessment methods. In decentralized
mechanisms a user only relies on the available local information which is not necessarily reli-
able, but in centralized mechanisms there is always a global and reliable source of information
available for all users. The decentralized mechanisms are more suitable for social networks, spe-
cially online social networks [54], where the monitoring of agent interactions should be adaptable
to large-scale settings. These mechanisms are mostly designed based on theory of referral net-
works [51, 56, 58], where users refer to each other by social ties. Designing and implementing
this type of mechanisms for social network environments is a hard task [45]. One of the main
problems is the unknown structure of current social networks. The way the network evolves and
grows is a factor of many known and unknown parameters [40]. Another major difficulty in
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designing such mechanisms is the unpredictable behavior of interacting agents [49]. Two main
lines of research to design such mechanisms are discussed in the following sections.
Probabilistic approaches
In this line of research, researchers apply different propagability theories in the context of
social network analysis in order to come up with some trust prediction algorithms. In the work
done by Kuter and Golbeck [39], the authors proposed a new explicit probabilistic interpretation
for social networks, which distinguishes between trust and confidence. Therefore, they proposed
a new trust inference algorithm called SUNNY that employs probabilistic sampling to separately
estimate trust information. Finally, they experimentally compared their work with another trust
inference algorithm TIDALTRUST [18]. In another seminal work conducted by Despotovic and
Aberer [13], the authors used maximum likelihood estimation and bayesian estimation in order
to estimate trust values. Then they examined their work in both peer to peer and social network
settings with some available data sets.
Mechanism design-based approaches
"Mechanism design is the sub-field of microeconomics and game theory that considers how to
implement good system-wide solutions to problems that involve multiple self-interested agents,
each with private information about their preferences" [50]. These approaches are built upon
design of payment mechanisms to incentivize agents to reveal the truth. Since the use of this
notion in the context of OSNs is relatively new, the literature regarding this approach is not
mature enough. In [16], Ghosh et al. proposed a decentralized incentive compatible payment (a
payment mechanism which ensures that all of the participants are fare best if they truthfully reveal
their private information) mechanism in which payments are based on I Owe You (IOU). The IOU
is an online decentralized currency, which is based on mutual loans that agents transfer to each
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other. The authors conducted a theoretical analysis on the proposed payment infrastructure in a
trust network. As a result of their analysis, they proved that under certain circumstances winner
determination (finding the best player with respect to the rules defined by the mechanism designer
and under the concept of social welfare) is an NP-hard problem. Furthermore, they approximated
the solution of winner determination problem with a factor of 1 - \ (meaning that the value of
the proposed mechanism is different from the optimal solution with the factor of 1 - -, where e
is a very small value).
2.4 Summary of Related Work
In summary, there are a wide variety of approaches being considered to tackle the problem of
trust in social networks, but none yet offers complete decentralized model that is adaptable for
large-scale settings. Many of the models discussed in this chapter suffer from scalability issue;
others rely on central trusted parties and cannot be implemented in large-scale systems, or are
very domain specific and dependent on the assumptions or situations under which they can be
applied. Convinced of the importance of modeling reputation propagation in OSNs and in gen-
eral decentralized online communities, we set out to develop a model to implement these issues
in the OSNs platform. The resulting, model is described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Game Theoretic Analysis of Reputation
Propagation in Online Social Networks
In Online Social Networks (OSNs), propagation of users' reputation through streams of agents'
connections is an important phenomenon that is often disregarded or misunderstood in social
network analysis. Modeling the dynamics of this phenomenon and analyzing its effects on users'
interactions are the main contributions of this chapter.
Users in OSNs are considered as autonomous agents, who are rational and self-interested.
Diversity of agents behavioral perspectives in terms of level of carefulness about their reputation
in the OSN obliged us to limit our theoretical analysis to two extreme cases of Presentisi (for
agents caring more about their present status in the network) and Futurist (for those caring more
about their future status in the network). Although, in Chapter 4 we consider three other types of
agents.
In order to analyze the interactions between Futurist and Presentisi, we deploy a game
theoretical approach. As a result, we expose some Nash behaviors of agents with aforementioned
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Presentisi and Futurist perspectives in both one shot and repeated interaction games.
3.1 Technical Background
In this section we give a brief overview about some basic concepts and terminology that we use
in this thesis. Most of the definitions in this section are extracted from Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy or [43].
Game theory: "Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among
economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents,
where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents." [2]
Perfect information game: "A game is said to have perfect information if all players know
all moves that have taken place." [2] Chess is an example of this type of game.
Normal-form game: "In game theory, normal form is a way of describing a game. Unlike
extensive form, normal-form representations are not graphical per se, but rather represent the
game by way of a matrix." [2]
Extensiveform game: An extensive-form game is a representation of a game in game theory.
This form demonstrates the game as a tree. Each node is considered as decision node represents
every possible states of the game that is played . A unique player starts the game and the other
players sequentially play their actions through the entire tree. The game ends at the terminal
nodes and payoffs are assigned to all players. Each player is represented by a non-terminal node
and can choose to play an action at non-terminal nodes. Each possible move is an edge leading
from that node to another node.
Repeated game: A repeated game (supergame or iterated game) is a given game which is
18
played repeatedly between the same set of players. A singleton game which is repeated only
once is called the base game or stage game or one-shot game. A repeated game which terminates
after a finite number of iterations is called3 finite repeated game.
Strategy: "In game theory, a strategy refers to one of the options that a player can choose." [2]
Pure strategy: "A pure strategy provides a complete definition of how a player will play a
game. In particular, it determines the move a player will make for any situation they could face.
A player's strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player." [2]
Mixed strategy: A strategy which is a combination of pure strategies with a specific proba-
bility assignment to each strategy.
Solution concept: "A solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how the game will be
played." [2]
Nash equilibrium: Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a
solution concept of a game with two or more players, in which the equilibrium strategies of the
players are known to all of them, and no player can increase his payoff by deviating from his
strategy.
Dominant Strategy: "A strategy is dominant if, regardless of what any other players do, the
strategy earns a player a larger payoff than any other. Hence, a strategy is dominant if it is always
better than any other strategy, for any profile of other players' actions." [2]
3.2 Model Preliminaries
In the next section we discuss two notions of Local Reputation and Reparation Propagation.
Before that, we have to define some basic concepts and notations. Many different definitions for
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OSNs have been proposed so far [27]. Our definition of OSN is as follows:
Definition 1. (OSN): OSN is a tuple G = (T, E) where T is the set of agents in the network
and E G T ? T is the set ofagents' connections.
In order to simplify our mathematical formulations we define the following operators:
Definition 2. (Ask Operator '?')·" Let a and b be agents in OSNs, a Qb represents a's action in
asking agent bfor a newfriendship relation.
Definition 3. (Accept Operator 'f')·" Let a and b be agents in OSNs, b@a represents b's action
in accepting agent a's requestfor newfriendship relation.
Definition 4. (Join Operator V): Let a and b be agents in OSNs, ai>b represents the initiation
ofnewfriendship relation, means ajoins b's friend list after a initiates the query.
3.2.1 Local Reputation
In the absence of a central reputation management system, an agent has to handle his reputation
by himself and also has to individually calculate the other's reputation in the network. This means
that agent a may have different measurement about agent b's reputation than agent c does. In this
section, we define a notion called Local Reputation (LRep(<pa)), which agent a uses to estimate
his own reputation in his local friendship network. In other words, agent a by using this measure-
ment tries to evaluate his reputation from the other agents point of view. Based on convergence
theory that says "people who wish to act in a certain way come together to form crowds" [4],
we can assume that an agent's attitude or behavioral perspective in his friendship network (here
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assumed as a crowd) could be the reflection of other agents' behavioral perspectives in that net-
work. Therefore, one possible way of measuring local reputation of agent a in the network is the
aggregation of his friends' (fa) reputation. This reputation is assessed by agent a itself.
Agent a uses this notion in order to estimate the contribution of new agents in his Local
Reputation in the network. It is important to mention that this notion only estimates the agent's
reputation in public scene, since an agent's reputation would have either a direct or indirect impact
on his friends' reputation. Rating function Fa : fa ->¦ [0, 1] is a personalized function that agent
a uses to rate agents in the network, where <pa represents agent a's set of friends. In this thesis
we assume that this function exists for each agent a and maps each agent in his friends' set (fa)
onto [0, 1]. An example of this rating function which we use for our experiment is proposed in
Chapter 4. We formulate S?ß?{fa) for agent a in the following equation.
S FaU)
LRep(<pa) = 3ßf; (1)\?a\
To give a better explanation of this notion we provide the following example. A given set of
friends for agent o is fa = {c, d, e, /, g} and the set of rankings that a assigns to his friends is:
{0.6, 0.7, 0.3, 0.9, 0.15}, then the LRep(tpa) = o-6+o.7+o.3+o.9+o.i5 = 0 53 Therefore agent a's
estimation about his reputation in the global scene is: 0.53.
3.2.2 Reputation Propagation
Agents with Futurist behavioral perspective would like to consider the effect of their actions in
propagation of their reputation to friends of friends and so on. In other words, an agent with this
behavioral perspective makes friends with the assumption that the new friend would initiate a new
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stream of reputation propagation through global network. An example of this action can be found
in the network of business firms. Each member of the network would like to expand his business
by interacting with larger firm having more opportunity of expansion. Agent with this behavioral
perspective establishes a friendship in order to increase his future reputation as well as his friends
in the network, instead of only thinking about the level of change on his current reputation with
his current set of friends. In order to design a proper notion, we define two probabilities P(a ? b)
and P(b T a\a Q b).
The first probability which we define in equation 2 calculates the probability that agent a asks
agent b to be his friend.
S FaU)
P(a ? 0) = —:—¡— (2)\<Pb\ + 1
The second probability, P(b f a\a ? b), represents the probability of acceptance of agent b
given that agent a asks him for friendship. This probability, defined in equation 5, considers two
cases: 1) an agent does not have any friend; 2) an Agent has at least one friend. For the former
case, we assume the probability that agent b accepts a's request is given, ßbea, that represents the
amount of risk that agent ò is willing to take by accepting agent a as a friend. In the latter case,
first we define two sets of O^ and ?* :
??? = ?a- (<Pb ? ?a)
(3)
Fa= U fon ?ß) ·
where Oa represents the set of a's friends except all mutual friends with b and F^ represents the




Figure 3.1: Visual representation of O£ and F„ for two sample networks of agents a and b.
Figure 3.1 represent an example of couple of friendship networks, where the blue vertical
oval represents F* and the red horizonal oval represents O^.
The second part of the conditional probability of acceptance is computed in a two-part ap-
proach. The first part assumes that the more friends two agents have in common, the higher is
the possibility of b accepting a, and the second part takes into account the probability of further
connection to agent ò's network. In fact, this part of probability reflects the chance that agent
b's current friends would accept agent a if he joins their community. These two approaches are
weighted with a as a factor of proportional relevance and merged in equation 4.
s = a~? G + (1 — Ol)-T-T-; (4)
To sum up, the final probability is shown in the following equation:
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ßbma if ?? = 0;
P(b®a\aQb) ={ (5)
otherwise.
Therefore, the probability that agent a joins agent b (P (a o b)) is calculated as follows:
P(at>b)= P(b®a\a Qb)x P(a Qb) (6)
We define the expansion factor of agent a on 6's network upon joining agents 6's network,
denoted by Ca>6 € [0, 1], in equation 7. This factor reflects how much agent a can be successful
in expanding his friendship (by propagation of his reputation) upon joining agent 6's friends list.
2
\<Pbl ' ~~\<Pantpb\




Note that since Cat>6 is a factor that represents agent 6's potential in expanding of agent a's
friendship network,these agents have at least one common friend. Therefore | ?a ? ipb |^ 0 is not
possible in our case.
For example, if ^iIp6 = {c, d, e} and a's rankings about these agents are respectively,
0.6, 0.9 and 0.8 and 6's rankings about them are respectively, 0.7, 0.55 and 0.3. If |<¿>6| = 5 and
\?a\ = 7 and 6's rankings about his friends in O£ are 0.8 and 0.56 then C^6 = 0.657. This means
that agent a's expansion factor upon joining agent 6's friendship network is 0.56.
Therefore, given P(a t> 6) we can calculate the chance (L^) of agent a expanding his friend-
ship network upon joining agent 6's network with the following equation:
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Lai>b — C0^b ? P(a > 6) (8)
In other words, La>b represents the chance of a friend of b asks a to join his network if a and
b are joined.
In the next section we consider strategic behaviors of agents with different behavioral per-
spectives inside the OSN. We introduce a game to analyze their strategies to select the best
possible set of friends.
3.3 Local Reputation vs. Reputation Propagation
3.3.1 Game Modeling
In this part we focus on the dynamics of agents' behavior as they establish new friendship rela-
tions and on the effects of their actions on each other's reputation after having t interactions (in
the game context we assume each interaction as a game iteration) in OSN. We design a game
to model the dynamic behaviors of agents in terms of formation and propagation of reputation
OSiVs. We assume agents in OSNs are self-interested, which means they adopt actions that
imize their utility. Agents depending on their behavioral perspective (Presentisi or Futurist)
interact with an agent who either recommends them to his friends or immediately improves their
local reputation. Given this fact, we introduce the Reputation Exchange game as follows:
Definition 5. (Reputation Exchange Game): Reputation exchange game is a finite extensive form
repeated game with perfect information, represented by a tuple (N, A, T, p), where




• A = {Ae,At} is the set of action profiles for two types of players: Evaluator (agent
who issues a friendship request) and Target (agent who receives the request)! Ae =
{NREC, REC, Ignore, Ask} represents the action profile of evaluator agents in the game.
Recommend (REC) represents the action preformed by an agent to propagate an oppo-
nent's reputation by an agent as recommending this opponent to the agent friends as a po-
tential choice of friendship and NREC is just a stationary action, which means not recom-
mending this opponent. The ask action represents the evaluator agent's willingness to initi-
ate a friendship, and Ignore represents the opposite. At = {NREC, REC, Accept, Reject}
represents the action profile of target agents in the game. Two possible actions when the
Target agent is managing friendship request are Accept and Reject. The Accept action is
the action of accepting the request of friendship. The action Reject is the action of reject-
ing the friendship action. The other actions of NREC and REC are similar to the ones
available for Evaluator agents.
• T = {(T1, T2, T3, ..., TT)}, is an ordered set of directed trees and each tree T¿ represents
a one-shot interaction game initiated with agent i. T* = (V\ E{), where nodes Vi and
edges E1 are elements of directed tree T\ We split Vi into two parts: TRj- (rectangu-
lar) and NTR (circular), where TR? represents terminal nodes (payoff nodes) and NTR?
•represents non-terminal nodes (decision nodes) in the tree.
• p = {p?, 7T2, ...., pt+1}, where p? : A ? A ->¦ RxK represents payoff function of players
in the game.
In this game we assume that players can interchange their roles (Evaluator to Target and
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C'" New Game Tree ***.V
Figure 3.2: One shot interaction. Circles represent decision nodes (non-terminals), edge labels represent actions.
Payoffs are represented in rectangles (terminals), the top row describes the payoff pair of the evaluator agent, the
second row describes payoff pair of the target agent.
vise versa) in the sense that some times they are being evaluated and some times they are evaluat-
ing other agents. We assume that agents only play pure strategies. Pure strategy is a strategy from
the strategy set covering all possible situations of a player without use of probability distributions
over strategies. If target agent b plays REC that means he will propagate agent a's (Evaluator)
reputation to at least one of his friends as a form of recommendation to add a to their friends' list.
We calculate the expected number of agents who are members of agent b's friends list and might
invite agent a to their network in the following formula:
\Lat>b ? \<pb\]
If agent b decides to play NREC, then agent a would only expect an increase in his local
reputation with the portion of r|^\. If the evaluator's intention in offering friendship to a target
agent was to propagate his reputation but that target agent does not do the same thing, that then
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evaluator agent might be worse off in this interaction.
Assuming the first agent who starts the game is the agent a, therefore agent a will repeatedly
play the game with other agents until he decides to play Ignore against all other agents and
stop playing the game. Furthermore, agent a might stop playing the game when he reaches his
threshold of interactions r. Figure 3.2 shows the game payoffs upon adopting different actions.
Structure of payoff for each player is a 2-part payoff: the first part represents the expected amount
of increase on agent's local reputation and the second part represents the expected number of
agents who will add him as a friend and adopt his reputation (believe in his reputation). The
top payoff is for the Evaluator agent and the bottom one is for the Target agent. Figure 3.2
(without Recommendation Pool and New Game Tree parts) represents a one-shot interaction
game tree where agent a at the end of the game might receive some other requests of friendship
from agents in the Recommendation Pool (where all the recommendation from different players
are aggregated). Thus, agent a' s role may change form Evaluator to Target agent, who is being
evaluated by agents in the recommendation pool and can start playing the game with other agents.
In Figure 3.2, first agent (a) preforms his action of Ignore or ask, if he preforms the Ignore
action then the corresponding payoff for both agents is (0,0). If a decides to play ask then his
payoff will depend on the 6's action. If b plays Reject then a will lose e and b will not lose
anything, therefore the payoffs would be (-e, 0) for agent a and (0, 0) for agent b. Agent a loses
this amount of local reputation (e) because his rating about the agent who recommended agent ö
or was the main source of reaching b is decreased and therefore agent a's local reputation in total
is decreased as an effect of this action. If a asks b and b accepts, then both agents may either play
NREC or REC. Their obtained payoffs out of playing actions is represented in Figure 3.2.
In the following subsections we analyze the Nash Equilibrium of the game in two cases:
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one-shot (t = 1) and repeated (r > 1) interactions.
3.3.2 Game Analysis
One-Shot Game Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Here we assume the case that t = 1 (t represents the number of interactions) and later on we
expand our analysis to the case that t > 1. Figure 3.2 shows the game payoffs for a one-shot
game for two players a and b. We analyze the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in
one-shot game with consideration of two behavioral perspectives of Futurist and Presentist.
We have four cases, Presentist — Presentist, Futurist - Presentist, Presentist - Futurist
and Futurist - Futurist. For any of these three cases we analyze the nash equilibrium.
In the case of Presentist - Presentist both agents would like to increase their local repu-
tation as opposed to number of their friends.
Proposition 1. In case ofPresentist - Presentist, ife > r^f^- then placing the action Ignore
would be the dominant strategyfor the Evaluator agent.
Proof. In the case that agents are both Presentist and not interested in propagation of their
reputation, increase in the second part of payoff is considered as a loss for them. As it is clear
from Figure 3.2, the best payoff that agent a as an Evaluator agent can gain out of playing in
this game is -e + j|^. If (-e + |^^) > 0 then agent initiates the request, otherwise the best
action of Evaluator agent is Ignore. Therefore in this case Ignore is a dominant strategy.
D
Proposition 2. In case ofPresentist- Presentist, ife < ^^ then (Ask- NREC, Accept -
NREC) is PSNE.
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Proof. If two players are Presentisi, their intention in playing the game and interacting with
other users is to increase their local reputation. In this case agents do not like to be recommended
and this means that the action REC for both agents is not a favorable action. Therefore, in the
case that agents know that they are both Presentisi and the Evaluator agent (a) takes the risk
of interaction and initiates the request, meaning that e < ^^, then the action Ask for Target
agent (6) has a better payoff compared to Reject, since b knows that if he plays Reject his payoff
is 0 and if he plays accept then there is chance of better payoff. Using backward induction, the
Figure 3.2 shows that the best terminal node (rectangular nodes including payoffs) for both agents
is the right most node of tree. If b plays NREC and a plays REC then b will be worse off in
the second part of his payoff and therefore he would rather to play Reject and if he plays this
action, a will worse off as well. But if b plays REC then no matter a plays REC or NREC he
will worse off and he will prefer to play Ignore from the beginning. If both agents play REC,
then they achieve the best payoff and the only case which agent a might deviate from this action
is when e > y^fj-, which we assume does not hold since agent a initiates the request. Therefore
(Ask - NREC, Accept - NREC) is a PSNE . ?
Proposition 3. In the case ofFuturist - Futurist, (Ask - REC, Accept - REC) is PSNE.
Proof. If both agents adopt the Futurist behavioral perspective then their intention in choosing
different strategies is to increase the second part of their payoff and immediate increase in their
local reputation (first part of payoff) cannot be considered as the main intention upon which they
choose their strategies. Using the backward induction technique, if agent b chooses the action
REC then a can choose both REC or NREC and if a chooses NREC then b still prefers to
choose REC but b would be worse off, since the second part of his payoff becomes 0. But if a
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and b both chooses REC, then b may chooses both Accept or Reject and because \Lh>ax \ ?a \
] > 0, he will choose Accept. Given b chooses Accept, a may choose Ignore or Ask, and since
b adopts the Accepi - REC strategy then even if e > /"^1 because \La>bx | (pb |] > 0 he will
choose the AsA; action. Therefore (AsA; - REC, Accept - REC) is PSNE.
D
Proposition 4. In the case ofFuturist — Presentisi behavioralperspectives, PSNE is (Ask —
REC, Accept - NREC).
Proof. In this case the Evaluator agent (a) is assumed to be Futurist and the Target agent (b)
is assumed to be Presentist. Therefore the favorable action for agent a is REC and the second
part of payoff (which represents the number of recommendation) is in higher priority than the
first part (which represents immediate in agent's local reputation) and for agent b action NREC
is a favorable action and the first part of payoff is in higher priority. Knowing this, if agent b plays
NREC and a plays REC non of them prefer deviating from their strategies, since both gained
the maximum payoff according to the Figure 3.2, so we are done.
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Proposition 5. In the case ofPresentist- Futurist, ife < ?^? then (Ask-NREC, Accept-
REC) is PSNE, otherwise performing the action Ignore would be a dominant strategy.
Proof. We start with the fact that agent a's intention in interaction with other agents is to increase
his local reputation. Therefore he always selects an opponent, which maximizes ,F°ff — e. In
general, if (iyj+1 — e) > 0 then most likely he starts the game unless he knows that agent b
will play the Reject action. But since 6 is a Futurist agent we know that agent b would prefer
to enhance his friendship network and therefore he plays Accept. Again using the backward
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induction, if b chooses the action REC and a also chooses REC then they are both in a stable
situation and do not like to deviate from this action; therefore (Ask - NREC, Accept - REC)




Here we assume t > 1, meaning agent a repeatedly plays the game with other agents, belonging
to the set or agents in the Recommendation Pool, until r is reached , thus each agent has at most
t trees. In which agents repeatedly adopt different actions. In this part we analyze the behavior of
agents with Presentist and Futurist behavioral perspectives in the platform of repeated game .
We setup our analysis based on evaluator agents' point of view, therefore we assume that agent a
to be an evaluator agent in the rest of this section. We calculate agent a's discounted payoff after
t interactions in equation 9, where p* represents agent a's expected payoff at tth game.
KT = E^'-1 (9)
i=i
where ? e [0, 1] is the discount factor applied to compute the present game value.
Now assuming that agent a's opponent(s) in T1 game(s) play NREC and in T2 game(s) play
REC where T1 + T2 < t, then we have three cases to analyze the behavioral pattern of agent a
during the t interactions. The first case, if T1 < t2; the second case, if T1 > r2; and the third case,
if T1 = T2. Considering the aforementioned conditions we analyze the PSNE of the repeated
game for both behavioral perspectives of agent a.
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We calculate the upper bound for both agent's behavioral perspectives, in order to be able
to calculate the agent's payoff in the optimal case and then based on that we find the Nash
equilibrium of repeated game.Given the agent a as a Presentisi, the upper bound of his expected
payoff (upyPresentist^ is caicu]ateci in the following equation:
upVPresentist = _£e.0J-l +Jt S ^tA£^ (I0)
where ACNREC represents the set of agents who played the action NREC in T1 interactions of
agent a.
Notice that agent a obtains the upper bound of his payoff if t = T1 and T2 — 0. Meaning that
agent a does not play with any Futurist agent and any Presentist agent whom a plays with
does not play REC, in the complete period of a's interactions in the network.
If agent a is Futurist, we calculate the upper bound wpVFauturist for a's expected payoff
after t interactions. Agent a obtains this upper bound if t = T2 and T1 = 0. This means that a
expects to play the game with agents who play the REC action entirely in the who period of his
interactions in the network.
upVFutUrist = j2 ¿ G?^??^?·^-1 di)
i=l keACREC
where ACREC represents the set of agents who played the action NREC in T2 interactions of
agent a.
Based on the abovementioned upper bounds the following conjectures follow:
Proposition 6. If the agent a is Presentist and T1 > \r and ? is small enough then NREC is
a dominant strategyfor Evaluator in his game horizon.
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Proof. We can proof this by using three cases:
Case 1: If T1 < \t . In this case the number of Futurist opponents is greater than
Presentist ones and therefore the case of Presentisi - Futurist game is the dominant case
and based on Proposition 5, Ask - NREC, Accept - REC is PNSE. This shows that in this
case the AsA; - NREC might be a dominant strategy but not necessarily (since e > P¥K in
some cases).
Case 2: If T1 = \t. In this the number of Futurist and Presentist opponents are the same
and there is no dominant case and therefore no conclusion can be derived from this case.
Case 3: If T1 > \r. In this case the number of Presentist opponents is greater than Futurist
ones and therefore the case ofpresentist - Presentist is a dominant case and therefore in based
on Propositions 1 and 2 the NREC should be a dominant strategy.
D
Proposition 7. If T1 = T2 and t = T1 + r2 then there is no PSNE in the game regardless of
agents ' behavioral perspectives.
Proof. This proposition has an straightforward proof, since we cannot identify that which of four
options of game that might happen between players is dominant. Therefore, regardless of agent's
behavioral perspectives, we cannot find any PNSE in the game.
D
Proposition 8. If agent a is Futurist and T2 > \t and ? is small enough, then Ask - REC is
a dominant strategyfor agent a in his game horizon.




Empirical Observations and Analysis
4.1 Experimental Goals and Scenario
The objective of this chapter is to verify our findings in Chapter 3 through experimentation using
a large-scale social network of Epinions [I]. In general, to run experiments on social network
platforms, researchers face many problems. One of the main problems arises when we want to
examine dynamic social behavior of users. Due to some privacy barriers, researchers usually
have to run their analysis on static dataseis, which are anonymized. Another challenging issue is
the consideration of large-scale social networks, where the sampling becomes a necessity. Fur-
thermore, real world networks are normally non-homogenous and therefore the sampling is not
an easy task. In this work, in order to tackle these problems, we first employ filtering algorithms
to filter five types of users that cover all possible behavioral perspective that an agent may adopt.
We deploy then a method to sample a homogenous population of users that includes those five
types. In fact, we conduct our experiments to explore the answers of the following questions:
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• How do our sampled users (agents) preform?
• Does the behavior of sampled users matches our findings in Chapter 3? (one-shot game)
• How does the history of interaction affect the synthetic (one of five filtered types of agents)
agents' behavior compared to the real agents? (repeated game)
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the experiments we carried out to compare the behavior of real users
(with different behavioral perspectives) with our synthetic agent. Synthetic agents represent users
that follow the Nash solutions that we found in Chapter 3, in order to interact with other agents.
To select synthetic agents from the sampled agents we deployed a filter algorithm that traces
agents' behavior during the period of observation and then selects agents who use the Nash
solution concept in over 90% of their social interactions. The filter program that we used, is
shared as an open source program for further development [3].
4.2.1 Characteristic of Social Network Dataset
We used data collected from the Epinions [1] social network over a six month period for our
experiments. Epinions is an OSN, in which users rate each others reviews on some existing
articles. There are approximately 75, 879 users in the network with 508, 837 user to user rates
given, 717, 667 trust rates (shown by +1) and 123, 705 distrust rates (represented by -1), with
85, 000 (64%) users having received at least one rating. Therefore the density of the user-user
matrix, which represents the density of ratings as well as sparsity of user connections, is:
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Number of nodes in the largest weakly connected component,
A weaklyconnected component is a maximal subgraph ofa directed graph such that for every pair ofvertices
u, ? in the subgraph, there is an undirected path frorrm to ? and a directed path from ? to u.
Number of edges in the largest weakly connected component
Number of nodes in the largest strongly connected component
A strongly connected component is a directed graph in which it is possible to reach anynodestartmgfrom anyother node bytraversingedges in the direction(s) in which they point.
Number of edges in the largest strongly connected componentAverage clustering coefficient ~
Average dusteringcoefficient is a measure ofdegree to which nodes in a graph tend to duster together.
Number of triples of connected nodes (considering the network as undirected)
Number of connected triples of nodes / number of (undirected) length 2 paths
Maximum undirected shortest path length (sampled over 1,000 random nodes)













75879 ? 75879 : 0.000014763
There are also approximately 49, 290 users who reviewed 139, 738 different items at least
once and the total number of reviews are 664, 824. Therefore the sparsity of reviews per item
and per users are respectively, 13.49 and 4.76. Table 4.2.1 represents the general characteristics
related to the given Epinions dataset. Notice that in Epinion social network, users have two main
activities: the first one, is the trust/distrust ratings that a user assigns to other users and the second
one, is the the ratings that a user assigns to articles. Here, in this experiment, we only analyze the
first part of users activity, which considers user to users trust/distrust ratings.
Figure 4.1 represents the distribution of trust and distrust, ratings in the OSN. In our ex-
periments we assumed that if a user posts a trust rating for another user, so this means a new
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Figure 4. 1 : Trust and distrust ratings distribution in epinions network.
one of them is rejecting or dishonoring the friendship relation. From Figure 4.1, we can observe
that the network is very sparse in terms of trust and distrust ratings. We can interpret the influence
of this fact on users' behavior in the sense that if a user receives a distrust rate, it has considerably
high effect on his future interactions in the network. Another natural interpretation of Figure 4.1
is that the rate of distrust action is lower than the rate of trust action (absolute value of slope is
less therefore the distribution of distrust rates is less). This reflects the natural tendency of users
to favor short-term interactions in comparison to the long-term ones in the Epinions network,
since users effort on propagating their negative experience (i.e. Distrust rating of other users)
about others is less compared to their positive experience (i.e. Trust rating of other users).
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4.2.2 Experiment Setup and Evaluation Criteria
We first define the global rating function we used in our experiments, which we assume common
for all users. User a rates user b (Fa(b)) according to their shared reviews (items that they both
reviewed) on different items and the deviation of 6's rate from the average of reviews on that item.
Assume user b has rated ? distinct items and he is sharing k (k < ? and ? ^ k) reviews with a
and the rest with other users. If 6's rating on ? items are {r\, ...,rbn} and a's shared reviews with
b are {rf, ..., r£} (they shared k items) then we define Fa(b) as follows:
Fa(b) = l-(-.^ - + .J ) (n)? k ? n-k ' K '
where r¿ is the average of reviews of other users of item i.
In order to observe the effects of users' history on their further interactions, we divide our
observation period into two 3-month period and then evaluate users' performance distinctly in
each period. As explained earlier in this chapter we developed our experiments on five types
of real users strained using our filtering algorithm. 1) Users with 90% to 100% Presentisi be-
havioral perspective, which means more than 90% of the interactions of these users reveal the
Presentist behavioral perspective ; 2) Moderate users with 40% to 50% Presentist and 40%
to 50% Futurist behavioral perspective, which means about half of interactions of these users
reveal Futurist and another half interactions reveal Presentist behavioral perspectives; 3) To-
tally Chaotic users, who are revealing an untraceable perspective during their interaction period;
4) Users with 90% to 100% Futurist behavioral perspective, which means more than 90% of the
interactions of these users reveal the Futurist behavioral perspective ; and 5) semi - Synthetic







? First Period of Observation
W






90% to 100% Moderate Chaotic 90% to 100% Serai-Synthetic
Presentist · Futurist
Figure 4.2: Distribution of different types of users' in Epinions network within two periods of observation.
in Figure 4.2, we select users in each period based on their distribution in the network within
that given time period. Table 4.2 also shows the distribution of users with different types in the
network as well as the number of sample users (Nk) selected from each type (k).
Evaluation Criteria
In order to evaluate the behavior of the users described in the previous section we define two mea-
surements that compare a user's actual local reputation and expansion chance with the best local
reputation and expansion chance observed in the network. We are interested in these measure-
ments because the game we have designed assumes that an agent following a pure Presentist
strategy will try to optimize his local reputation and a Futurist will try to optimize his expan-
sion chance. We use Mean Local Reputation Deviation (MLRD) to measure the success of users
with different types in increasing their local reputation, and Mean Expansion Chance Deviation
(MELD) to measure the success of users with different types in propagating their reputation.
We compute these two metrics, defined from time tstart (user start making friends in the network)
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Table 4.2: Distribution of different types of users in Epinions network within the period of 6 months observation.













































to the time tstop (user stop making friends in the network), in equations 13. In this equation,
LRep'foj) represents user j's local reputation at time unit i e {tstart,tstop}, IRe^ipu^) rep-
resents the best observed local reputation in data set at time unit i, and Nk is the set of sample
users with type k. AEC) represents the average of user j's friends Expansion Chance at time
unit i e [tstart ,tend\, AEC\est represents the highest observed friends community average of








4.2.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 summarize the distributions of user types in the given dataset as well as
the number of selection in each user type. The main experimental results are shown in Figure 4.3
and Table 4.3.
Recall that the main objective we target in this thesis is to provide a model of reputation
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Table 4.3: MLRD and MELD performance measurement for different types of users in comparison to the best





































































propagation in OSNs and to extract some natural solution concepts for users who behave like a
self-interested autonomous agent in the network. In Figure 4.3 we observe that the average per-
formance of semi — Synthetic users is better than other users, given the very sparse interaction
network of Epinions. In the MELD comparison test, as we have expected from the theoreti-
cal part, the Futurist users preformed better than Presentist users and sometimes better than
semi - Synthtic users, but since they greedily make friendship with users with high potential
expansion rate, they do not preform better than semi - Synthetic users in general. This is due
to the fact that they do not act strategically but have a very greedy behavior in making friends,
and consequently their MELD trend oscillates. In MLRD experiment, semi - Synthetic
users perform much better than the others (Table 4.3) especially in comparison with Presentist
users, because semi - Synthetic users adopt different strategies for different users in the net-
work. The performance of Futurist users in this experiment is the worst and it shows the side
effects of greedy behavior of this type of agents in the network, given the existence of differ-
ent types of users with different behavioral perspectives. The observation on the existence of a
large number of Presentist users in Epinions network and their lower performance compared to
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Figure 4.3: MLRD and MELD comparison on sampled users.
semi - Synthetic users, especially our MELD comparison test confirms the results obtained in
Chapter 3. Similar argument applies to Futursit users in MLRD comparison experiment where
again we observe the results obtained in Chapter 3.
Our observations on different types of users over the period of six months illustrate some
interesting remarks. 1) Gradual change in users behavioral perspectives by the time passing; 2)
Considerable decrease in the percentage of Presentist users which, despite sparsity of users
reviews, shows the high effects of greedy and superficial rates on this type of users' reputation
in the network; 3) Considerable decrease in the percentage of Chaotic users and high rate of
increase in the number of Moderate and semi - Synthetic users. These points reflect first, high
tendency of users to learn from the network, second, rational behavior of these users and finally,
effectiveness of the Nash solutions presented in the previous chapter.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
The primary goal of the thesis was to model users' reputation propagation in OSNs as outlined
in Chapter 1. That goal has been achieved by employing a probabilistic and game theoretic
approach in Chapter 3. The model has been implemented and evaluated using a large-scale real
world network dataset. An open source software has been provided to filter users' behavior and
then trace the filtered users' behavior, which has been explained in Chapter 4. In this chapter
we conclude the the thesis and propose some potential lines of research as future work. We also
provide some possible guidelines to these lines of researches.
5.1 Conclusion
Propagation of reputation as a foundation for modeling trust-distrust propagation in the context of
057Vs has received insufficient attention from researchers in the fields of trust and social network.
Issues related to reputation propagation are rarely discussed in published work, particularly from
game theoretic perspective. Many game theoretic models have been proposed to model trust and
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distrust, but only little focus has been shown on reputation propagation.
In this thesis, We have modeled behavioral perspectives of users regarding their reputation in
OSNs. We use two concepts of local reputation and reputation propagation to model the main
actions of users in order to manipulate their reputation in OSNs. In our analytical approach, to
model these two behavioral perspectives, we highlight the Nash solution concepts for users with
either short-term {Presentisi) or long-term {Futurist) interaction plans. We have filtered users
following the behavioral patterns identified in our theoretical analysis in addition to users with
different types from the dataset of Epinions. Therefore, the behaviors of these users have been
empirically compared and analyzed. We also study the behaviors of users with different types.
As we have expected from the theoretical part, users with a behavior similar to Nash have shown
highly adaptive behavior compared to the other types of users. Surprisingly, agents with com-
plete Futurist attitude represent very low rate of adaptation to the short-term interactions and
completely Presentist agents also exhibit a very low rate of adaptation in long-term interactions
(similar to chaotic agents). This approach is general enough to be applied to a wide variety of
online communities, such as online social network advertising, viral marketing and so on.
5.2 Future Work
While our work addresses important issues regarding the propagation of reputation in OSNs, it
raises other questions and highlights areas that may be fruitful upon further investigation. Here,
we briefly address one of the most important research lines among all possible ones. Apart form
analyzing the dynamics of reputation propagation in OSNs, this question always arises: how can
an agent enforce the propagation of incentives? First step to resolve this problem is to enforce
45
agents to act truthfully in the domain of OSNs. Therefore, we would like to determine how much
incentive is required for agents to maximize their reputation propagation in the network after a
certain number of iterations. We believe this can be done by using the idea of Query Incentive
Network proposed by Klienberg and Raghavan [37]. A challenging issue is to find out how much
incentive is required for agents to maximize their reputation propagation in the network after a
certain number of interactions. In the next section we propose a potential model that could be
extended to resolve this issue.
5.2.1 The Potential Model
We consider an Online Information Network where there are rational users seeking specific infor-
mation (IS agents) and there are information providers (IP agent) who are selling information
in different categories (e.g. information about car manufacturers or information about cell phone
types and brands).
Two main probabilities that affect an IS agents' decision in adopting an actions are: 1) the
probability of receiving a query P'(.), at time unit t, from other IS agents; and 2) the probability
of initiating a query. We assume that the probability g is a constant probability and is known
for all agents in the network. However, the probability or receiving a query at time unit ? is a
dynamic probability, which changes over the time and it depending of several factors.
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